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Article 6

Book Reviews

The High Medieval Dream Vision: Poetry, Philosophy, and Literary Form by
Kathryn L. Lynch. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988. Pp. xiv + 263.
$35.00.
Kathryn Lynch's intriguing and fascinating study of medieval dream vision
poetry reinterprets the dream vision genre and Ie-evaluates the five works
she identifies as central to her discussion-Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae, Alain de Lille's De Planetu Naturae, Jean de Meun's Roman de la Rose,
Dante's Purgatoria, and John Gower's Confessio Amantis. She limits her focus
to what she calls the "high medieval dream vision poem," a subgenre which
she identifies as philosophical (a term she prefers over "Boethian"), crystallizing within the formative period approximately between the years 1100 and
1300. Her background material has been thoroughly researched, and her thesis proceeds logically and forcefully along consistently subtle and finely nuanced readings. Drawing upon a wide range of earlier classical and medieval
visions, theories of dreams, and modern critical commentary, Lynch argues
persuasively for a "historicization" of the dream vision genre, by which she
means linking such poems to their specific philosophical and cultural backgrounds.
In many ways, Lynch's book is an important event in medieval dream vision studies. She views "genre" in terms of reception theory, hermeneutics,
and traditional historical scholarship, and while she does not redefine the
term, she nevertheless arrives at a new working synthesis; her combined
diachronic and synchronic approach avoids the essentialist and formalist extremes of much earlier and current dream vision theory. Her work is decidedly "historicist" in the best traditional sense, although she denies that view
which sees genre as merely reflective or expressive of meaning. Susceptible
to historical pressures, genre nevertheless participates in meaning production,
its evolutionary modifications themselves contributing to philosophical exploration of generic preoccupations. Her analyses of individual works remain
within the confines of traditional criticism, yet within her generic paradigm
she adapts her methods to the work in hand with close and sensitive attention to stylistics as well as the more conventional concerns of allegorical figure and narrative structure. Finally, her reassessment of medieval literary
theory, especially her exploration of the role and function of the imagination,
provides a necessary chapter in the history of medieval dream vision criticism, and represents a substantial insight into both the genre and the literature of the period.
As her title suggests, however, Lynch sets for herself a formidable and ambitious task. Philosophy, literary theory, criticism, and dream theory, placed
within the historical perspectives of shifting medieval climates of opinion,
form the background to interpretation. The result is a complex book richly
textured with detailed and highly interdisciplinary arguments which defy accurate summary, and my commentary must necessarily be selective. A book
of such scope, of course, frequently entails risks proportional to the venture,
and the real accomplishment of this book lies in the relatively few weaknesses discernible among its many strengths.
Lynch argues that within the greater genre of dream vision poetry we can
distinguish a subgenre-the philosophical vision. Originating with Boethius'
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Consolation, the philosophical vision has an explicitly discursive function; repeating allegorical characters (Nature, Reason, and Genius) and a shared concern with arguments centered on sex, love, the limits of human knowledge,
and the use and status of poetic fictions define its basic parameters. The informing principle behind this type of vision is the preoccupation with" order"
(the harmony of the natural and the supernatural) and its intelligibility.
Because the medieval spirit of synthesis has its location in the thirteenth
century and prior to it, Lynch modifies her scope to include only the High
Medieval Dream Vision. The thrust for the harmony of nature and supernature rests in the security of an earlier metaphysics, based on the realist theory
of abstraction, and when this theory breaks down in the fourteenth century,
Lynch argues, poets and poetry associated with the dream vision change.
Poets writing philosophical visions, then, are High as opposed to Late Medieval figures, or, like Dante and John Gower, conservatives harkening back to
an older world view. Lynch justifies her historical limitation of the subgenre
on the premise that the prenominalist epistemological model based on the
metaphysical theory of abstraction represents the essential paradigm, and
much of her book explores this paradigm in itself and in context of the five
major works and their immediate sources, which she analyzes.
The limited scope of Lynch's book is both a strength and weakness. It allows her a workable field of inquiry which avoids some of the pitfalls of earlier studies. Scholars have grouped as dream visions works so numerous and
diverse in character that generalizations about genre become too broad to be
of much use. Attempts to discover archetypes connecting dream visions with
actual dreams and visions tend to create essences or universals which deny
the necessary historical positioning of particular works and reduce distinctions between the medieval period and ours. Lynch seeks to examine the
philosophical vision as it evolves in medieval time subject to changing historical (philosophical) pressures, and her manageable focus restricts her perspective to texts similar in form and aim. Her willingness to include Dante and
Gower, however, threatens her self-imposed limitations, and begs several
questions. If Gower, why not Chaucer and Langland? Lynch answers that
while Langland and Chaucer engage similar problems in their dream visions,
their fourteenth century ambiguity towards clear possibilities of knowing implies a loss of the harmonizing struggle central to the philosophical vision
(Langland) or a distorting contamination of philosophical vision by the
courtly love subgenre with its different intentions (Chaucer). Since Chaucer
and Langland base large portions of their works on philosophical visions
Lynch deems central (Langland's Knyde presents the dreamer with
"ensaumples to knowe,fThorugh ech a creature, Kynde my creatour to
lovye" [Passus 11, B-Text, 324-25J and Chaucer's "goddesse Nature" is devised "right as Aleyn, in the Pleynt of Kynde" [The Parliament of Fowls, 303,
316J refer respectively to the theory of abstraction and the Plaint of Nature),
exclusion of them and other later writers would seem to require a fuller justification than Lynch provides. Furthermore, Dante's philosophical vision consists of only part of the Purgatorio (cantos 9-27), and although one can agree
with Lynch that Dante seems in this section of the Commedia preoccupied
with a philosophical ascent from imagination and image to reason and idea,
can we legitimately extract relevant passages and present them as "subgeneric," equivalent to the formal unity the philosophical vision represents?
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The principle which animates Lynch's discussion however, is her outline
of the essentially Aristotelian theory of abstraction and the role imagination
plays in its medieval adaptation. Medieval literary theory has occasioned
much recent interest and attention, both in its own right and as part of our
current fascination with literary theory within the discipline of English
studies. Lynch contributes to this ongoing debate with her lllustration of interdisciplinary correspondences, for she argues persuasively for a series of
key connections among the theory of abstraction, medieval faculty psychology, liminal experiences, dream lore, ritual and narrative structure, and theories of literature. According to the theory of abstraction, knowledge begins
with sense impressions from the natural, phenomenal world; imagination
creates "images" of particular impressions, stores them, and combines them;
reason then abstracts from these images "essences," "universals" or "ideas,"
the intellectual foundation of knowledge in realist or moderately realist philosophy; memory stores the conclusions of reason and perhaps images of
sense impression, establishing the possibility of experience. The three faculties-imagination, reason, and memory-allow the process of knowledge to
take place, and are capable, then, of actualizing a harmony between the natural world of appearances and the intelligible world of ideas, which correspond to the ideas in the mind of God responsible for the creation of the natural world in the first place. As Lynch points out, the imagination functions
as the bridging faculty, the link between nature and supemature and therefore a crucial factor in the discovery of truth and in the reconciliation of the
divine and natural orders.
This is the "realist paradigm" which Lynch posits as the fundamental interpretive framework of the High Middle Ages. Writers of philosophical visions do not seek to repeat the paradigm, but to defend .it, to incorporate
within its structures threatening ideas and experiences. Consequently, historical pressures exerted on any individual author result in a continuous as opposed to discontinuous change in the paradigm, and as the process of accommodation becomes more and more difficult with the emergence of new conflicting views and empirical data, the attempt takes the form of a
reconsideration and restructuring of first principles. The philosophical vision,
then, becomes a self-reflexive genre, rewriting the essential relations among
imagination, memory, and reason. This view of an intellectually homogenous
High Middle Ages, however, jeopardizes her historicism with the very essentialism she claims to avoid. Although Lynch at times seems aware of this paradox, her efforts to eliminate it appear on a theoretical level of assertion,
whereas in practice she casts an inevitable strain on her reading of individual
works in order to justify and confirm her thesis.
The most original and interesting aspect of the book lies in its exploration
of medieval poetics, and Lynch supplies a much needed and desired analysis
of period views of the imagination and the value of poetry. An obvious gap,
given the stress on the theory of abstraction, lies in the absence of sustained
discussion of memory, especially since the role of memory alters depending
on whether one sees it in a Platonic or Aristotelian light. Platonic reminiscence may have been superseded by Aristotelian memory, but what then is
the ordering function and role of Aristotelian memory?
Imagination, however, gains in scope and importance in the thirteenth cenf
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tury, affecting the significance of its function in dreams, poetry, and the acquisition of knowledge. Imagination's role in harmonizing nature (images of
phenomena) and reason/supemature (knowledge of underlying order or
ideas in phenomenal images) is clear; without imagination, knowledge and
harmony cannot take place. At the same time, imagination limits the intellect, necessarily subjecting it to the world of the senses and to possible error,
since the imagination can also produce false images in dreams or combine
various sensaus impressions even in waking. The proper use of the imagina-

tion for medieval theorists lies not in its unrestrained capacity to formulate
and store images, but in its service to reason; imagination has to be ordered

to reason or intellect. In addition to the power of apprehension, imagination
had other creative resources, which in the High Middie Ages, Lynch claims,
grew in importance. In the first place, it was in itseif creative, capable of generating images, combining and recalling them without any stimulation from
external senses, and to present them to other faculties of the mind for judgement; creative images so ordered by reason imitate divine truth. Lynch notices another related faculty, ingenium, sometimes conceived as part of imagination, and at other times a separate but associated faculty, endowed with
perception, a prerational kind of understanding; for Dante, ingenio denotes
the poetic power of fashioning comparisons or embodying ineffable ideas.
Ingenium becomes an inspired facuity, informed by an ability to interpret
both material and immaterial reality, similar to the modem idea of "genius"
-the gift of poetic inspiration and invention (in the medieval sense of discovery but also in the sense of the creation of prerational images). Working
together with reason, it enables the poet to order or diScipline his subject
matter in order to express through sensible images eternal truth. Writers of
philosophical visions, Lynch implies, because of the new scope and function
of imagination/ingenium, understand poetic art or "making" as analogous to
God's creation: "Indeed, poetry's achievement grows not only out of the
poet's intention to create discrete images of truth but also by the capacity of
his narrative to create an order or sequence of experience that will allow the
reader by the end of the work to abstract God's truth from poetic images as
he does also from images in nature" (44). Philosophical visions present not
oniy images but a process of vision, "an epistemological journey: imitative of
the process of knowing.
Lynch's reassessment of imagination suggests that medieval poets were not
as rigid and as schematized as many have been led to believe, and the idea
of a rational expressive creativity maintains historical difference without en-

tirely alienating medieval practitioners from later Hirrational' theories of creativity. "Genius" forms a bridge where before none existed. Lynch also shows
that in many medieval texts of commentary and criticism-and significantly
in many of the philosophical visions of her study-the word ingenium frequently appears: in Dante, Alain, and Jean de Meun, for example. She argues
cogently throughout that the allegorical figure "Genius: newly conceived by
Alain and prominent in subsequent philosophical visions, combines generative force with ingenium, and that the imaginative knowing process culminates with the reconciliation inherent in this figure's nature and role. More-

over, this new dignity of imagination affects poetic and dream theories; Augustine's visio spiritualis supplies a justifiable category of dream vision,
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which imitates the epistemological journey and does so under the heightened
activity of the imagination. The philosophical vision represents the perfect
medium, where the redemption of the imagination, and therefore the bridge
between nature and supernature, becomes both subject and form. Moreover,
the reader, as he struggles with the dreamer in the attempt at understanding,
participates in the epistemological experience, a formal poetic strength not
available to philosophy, a means of effecting a rational/imaginative reconciliation not possible in discursive prose. Lynch initiates in a sound and stimulating manner a discourse of medieval imagination which promises to become the focus of future students of medieval poetics.
Lynch's model for the philosophical vision remains Boethius's Consolation
of Philosophy, the standard model for most theories of medieval dream vision
genre, as in the recent studies of J. Stephen Russell, The English Dream Vision,
and Michael Cherniss, Boethian Apocalypse. Lynch differs from other readers
in seeing the Consolation as an epistemological journey incorporating the
theory of abstraction as an internal narrative structure, not simply a doctrine.
Boethius addresses the problem of evil in a world created and governed by a
good and rational God, and while he combines Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of knowing, the problem of reconciliation, together with the suggestive
but only partly realized Aristotelian solution, generates the subsequent rewriting of later authors. Lady Phllosophy represents Reason and Archetypal
Memory, and the narrator, initiating the generic role of subsequent dreamers
in philosophical visions, represents the disordered or unredeemed human
imagination, which undergoes "ordering." Personal worldy experience, natural images, and "wounded muses" form the opening perspective, and Lynch
notes that subsequent philosophical visions similarly open with a luxuriance
of images to a dreamer who lacks the strength of reason to interpret them
correctly. At the end of the Consolation, the meaning of these "seminal
images" becomes clarified, the growth of awareness in the increasingly
healed dreamer sprouting from the seeds themselves. Although the final
summation of truth is left to the prose of Lady Philosophy, the final four
poems, spoken by the newly aware dreamer, offer an "emotional equivalent
to reason" (73), images reflecting divine truth finally ordered by and aligned
to Lady Philosophy.
The other philosophical visions follow this model of the "natural" order of
knowing, and each in turn attempts to modify and contemporize the resolutions posited by Boethius in light of current epistemological challenges occasioned by new strains placed on the theory of abstraction. Lynch's strategy is
to examine the modulating shifts in allegorical figures and to discover the
subsequent poetic thrust of imaging and imagining. Alain in De Planctu Naturae clarifies the Aristotelian metaphysical strain evident in Boethius by substituting Nature for Lady Philosophy. Here is no longer merely the voice of
philosophical reason, but the voice of reason in nature; she represents, in
other words, that reason which permits man to abstract truth from created
nature. The dreamer's disordered imagination emerges in his opening confusion, but also in the limitations naturally imposed on Nature in her initial
reasonings; she is not so much a projection of the dreamer's unredeemed self
as a figure limiting her discussion to the limited capacity of the dreamer.
Alain's Genius effects the desired reconciliation. A symbol of natural genera-
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tive force, he also represents imagination aligned with Nature (Reason), his
very presence indicating the epistemological progress of the dreamer. As a
figure of imagination (genius/ingenium), Genius initiates the cognitive process that culminates in the highest truths. De P!anctu rewrites the allegorical
figure of Genius, and reformulates his role, for the doctrine Genius declares
is not as important as the image he figures, and the resolution he effects derives from his mythic and metaphorical aspects. Alain, Lynch suggests, continues the Boethian model in the direction of Aristotelian epistemology.
Lynch sees Jean de Meun, Dante, and Gower facing serious problems with
the model, marked by the Bishop Tempier's condemnation of 219 Averroistic
and Aristotelian propositions in 1277. Philosophy with its "double truth" had
gone too far in Tempier's view, and he narrowed the areas open to the explorations of natural reason divorced from revelation and theology. Whether or
not this directly led to the development of conceptualist logic which ultimately defied and dismantled the claims of metaphysical reason is still debated, but at the very least it casts doubt on the· possibility of human reason
discovering eternal truth. Jean's answer, Lynch argues, was to suggest to
Tempier that the abuse of reason, not reason itself, was to blame. His continuation of the Roman de la Rose represents an adjustment of Guillaume's section in the direction of the philosophical vision, but negatively conceived, for
here we see the failure and not the achievement of vision. Lynch's analysis
here is sensitive and perceptive. Reason, rejected by Amans, nevertheless
remains the only unquestioned authority figure in the poem. Genius and Nature now reflect a disordered imagination which never emerges from confusion, and consequently their arguments are incoherent, blasphemous, and
frequently heretical, subscribing to many of the views condemned by Tempier. Jean's revision of the dreamer also points to historical accommodation.
He becomes a "cartoon nominalist" (126) who denies belief in any essential
reality inhering in the thing itself, and who accepts the position that universals exist only in the mind. He shares the same kind of generic epistemological failure as other dreamers, except in reverse. He overabstracts, rather than
over-imagines, but because his abstractions have no concrete referent, his
progress from image to abstraction is impossible, and he rejects Reason. The
presence of Reason, however, indicates that rational study need not end this
way, and that rational endeavors in themselves are not evil, but can lead to
the evil of unrestrained eroticism when abused. This is an attractive reading,
although one which rationalizes the ironies, contradictions, blasphemies, and
anomalies of the Roman out of existence, depriving it of those tensions which
to many are its very strengths.
Dante and Gower represent conservative voices among the growing crowd
of epistemological doubts which torment the fourteenth century, and both
take up the issue of "misguided love" merged with the philosophical vision
by Jean de Meun. Even though Dante dispenses with the familiar allegorical
figures of Reason, Nature, or Genius, Purgatorio (9-27) represents "the most
ambitious and confident history of a spiritual journey ever attempted" (146),
a brilliant offensive maneuver in the midst of increasingly defensive tactics.
Placed between the infernal region of unregenerate sin and corporeality and
the paradisiacal region of beatitude, purgatory appropriately symbolizes the
bridge between the two, and the location of Dante's regeneration of sight and
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insight. Here Dante explores "earthly or human sins of the imagination" (152)
and his pilgrim moves from misplaced imaginative desire at the Gates of Purgatory to the inner rectitude of Earthly Paradise, guided by Virgil (reason)
and then Beatrice. Three dream visions and an apostrophe to illuminated
imagination (canto 17) confirm Lynch's reading of the subject and structure
of this section, with its tribute to the powers of human apprehension stretching from the imagination to the stars. Gower, however, is more self-conscious
and less confident, "re-visioning" (178) Jean's Genius in a manner both confirming and questioning the epistemological journey. A figure of disordered
imagination at the beginning of the Confessio, Genius grows into ordered understanding, like Amans; "practice, effect, and intent have been out of
balance" (196) throughout most of the poem, for Genius often misinterprets
his exempla, the significance of which emerges by means of counterpointing
stylistic foregrounding. Gower's Genius owes much to Jean's, except that he
moves from order to disorder, and finally embodies the rationalized imagination necessary for the act of knowing and the consequent reconciliation of nature and supemature. Gower's is a rearguard action, however, in the battle to
save the theory of abstraction. Where Jean challenges opposition and Dante
opposes it, Gower retreats into a nostalgic conservatism, unable to sustain
convincingly a rapport between world and Word.
The High Medieval Dream Vision erects a solid interdisciplinary edifice, a
substantial overview of subgenre capable of locating and describing the internal structures and "mechanics" (8) of some of the most influential medieval
works. Lynch's rational and historical analysis does justice to the philosophical nature of her thesis, although dispensing with differences and contradictions which other critical perspectives might offer. Her bibliography is up to
date and thorough, and her text virtually error-free, the only significant exception being the unfortunate phrase "unintelligible form" (31). At the same
time, these remarks do not detract from the real achievement of Lynch's
work. This is the kind of book on dream vision poetry medievalists have
been waiting for, and it promises to initiate new directions by sparking challenge as well as continuation.

Wilfrid Laurier University

James F. G. Weldon

The Death of Literature by Alvin Kernan. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1990. Pp. ix + 230. $22.50.
Alvin Kernan's new book consists of eight miscellaneous chapters, framed
by an Introduction and an Epilogue that carry the weight of the overall argument. The central topic that Kernan addresses is the large-scale, multifaceted
institutional and cultural change of "the past thirty years" (p. 1), a time
scheme that makes the 1960s the crucial turning point in the demise of the
old order that prevailed "between the mid-eighteenth century and the midtwentieth" (pp. 5-6). The key question becomes: how does Kernan characterize the new situation in our current historical moment?
Kernan's relation to the topic of cultural change is organized by his alterna-
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tion between the two postures of journalist and prophet. In the former role,
he parades a collection of contemporary symptoms in a breezy, cursory fashion. His account of curricular change at Stanford is representative of the
catchy, superficial style of tabloid reportage:
In 1988, Stanford University, for example, made the front pages and
the TV news programs with a debate about whether its reqUired course
in great books, including many works of literature, should drop some
of the classics, all written by "dead white males," to make room for the
inclusion of books by women, blacks, and Third World writers. The
great books which had hitherto formed the basis of liberal education
were denounced as elitist, Eurocentric, and the tools of imperialism.
Under this kind of pressure, the faculty and administration agreed to
replace such writers as Homer and Dickens with books like Simone de
Beauvoir's Second Sex. (pp. 3-4)
As journalist, Kernan claims to be impartial:
It is as fact, not a judgment
of what has happened, that they [the "new views"] are here described in as
neutral a way as possible" (p. 2). But neutrality is not possible because Kernan's vocabulary is loaded, negatively toned, and overwhelmingly alarmist.
Moreover, as prophet, Kernan is anxious to render judgment. It is the affinity
of the two roles of journalist and prophet that gives the book its flavor and
structure: since both roles appeal to the same vocabulary, Kernan's voice
readily slips back and forth between, and blends, the two perspectives.
Kernan's journalistic function feeds his particular prophetic stance as a cultural lamenter who tilts toward, sides with, the pessimists: "Even if Bennett,
Hirsch, and Bloom are taken at something less than face value, the widespread interest in their views testifies to a general concern that book culture,
of which literature is a central part, is disappearing, and with it many of society's central values" (pp. 4-5). The "many optimists who see a new and better
literary system arising phoenixlike from the ashes of the old" are dismissively
undercut by withering mock-heroic parody: "This redirection of literature is
perceived by its supporters as a giant step for humankind" (p. 5). Kernan's
preoccupation is rather with the ashes, as the central image of death in the
book's title insists. Death may not be too strong a term to evoke the magnitude of the cultural change we are going through, but Kernan misidentifies its
referent. It is not literature that has died, but rather a set of literary critical
habits.
Death in this latter sense is exemplified by Kernan's discussion of Norman
Mailer (pp. 204-205, 207), who symbolizes the artist's inability to recover
from" a crisis of confidence in the traditional values of literature" (p. 3). Even
more striking than his selection of Mailer as an index of cultural health is
Kernan's refusal to look elsewhere, further afield. Kernan's image of death
applies to a limited range of literature that has disappOinted him. However,
rather than explore new literary territory, Kernan places a self-imposed restriction on the intellectual field he is willing to encompass and gives himself
over to mourning. How does Kernan back himself into a comer in which the
elegiac mode appears the only palatable option? Why is despair preferable to
expanding the range of literary material?
fI,
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Contrary to Kernan's position, literature is very much alive. But its life has
shifted in large measure to emergent minority literatures. The most important
and powerful literary experiences I have had during the past decade have
come from such writers, to name only an abbreviated short list, as Rita Dove,
june jordan, Paule Marshall, Toni Morrison, Gloria Naylor, Alice Walker;
Paula Gunn Allen, Louise Erdrich, Joy Harjo, Linda Hogan, Leslie Marmon
Silko; joy Kogawa, Yoshiko Uchida. Such writers are now carriers of the values that Kernan cherishes and thinks have disappeared: "the belief in writing
and creating art as near sacred callings, the visionary power of the imagination, the perfect form and the truth of the literary text ... " (p. 203). One reason that Kernan cannot acknowledge the massive shift of cultural energy represented by the extraordinary growth of minority literatures is that this realignment has occurred on a scale not envisioned in the standard formulation
of literary tradition given by T.5. Eliot in "Tradition and the Individual
Talent" and duly cited by Kernan (p. 14). Kernan can neglect major new literary developments only by seeing them as noncanonical, inferior, and incidental. This perception is implied by the ominous, condensed allusion to
"less prestigious writings" in the counterpointing of "traditional intellectual
qualities represented by the classics of literature versus social values of equality of gender and race represented by less prestigious writings" (p. 4). Or witness the offhand gesture to "writings by blacks and authors of various ethnic
origins, not previously considered significant enough to be included in the
official literary canon" (p. 86). These phrases are based on a. conspicuously
unexamined assumption; their claim to validity rests on Kernan's avoidance
and ignorance of the literature he classifies as unworthy.
A similar technique of avoidance is apparent in Kernan's treatment of feminism as a critical approach. His repeated references to feminism demonstrate
no attempt at scholarly investigation, no pretense of serious acquaintance
with different kinds of feminist literary criticism. Instead, Kernan uses the
term "feminism" as a code word in expectation of a simple stock response.
As Kernan's invocation of the word "positive" three times on his final page
(p. 213) indicates, the outcome of feminist criticism is in his view negative:
"Give away, lose, or discredit these texts-Homer, Shakespeare, Balzac-and
literature is out of business" (p. 212). The basic assumption is that sharply to
criticize literature is to empty out and nullify it. I dispute this view. Feminist
criticism of Shakespeare, for instance, is both thriving and positive. Feminist
critical negotiations with Shakespeare's texts offer not the meretricious exhilaration Kernan alleges, but rather a responsible and culturally vital process of
reassessment in the context of a greatly expanded and diversified literary
field. However, the positive implications emerge fully only when one is willing to recognize and actively to engage this newly enlarged field.
Clark Art Institute

Peter Erickson
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Alternate Worlds: A Study of Postmodern Antirealistic American Fiction by John
Kuehl. With an Introduction and Interview by James Tuttleton. New York:
New York University Press, 1989. Pp. 373. $50.00.
When the American postmodemist novel is taught in other than graduate
classes or seminars in postmodemism, the selections tend to have a predictable sameness. Favored works are the short, accessible texts that can readily
serve as "samplers" to the contemporary antirealists, arguably our most brilliant, but also irksome group of prose fiction writers. Hesitant to confront the
novels by William Gaddis, Thomas Pynchon, and Joseph McElroy that reach
nearly one-thousand pages, many readers are left to judge antirealism by the
more approachable books like Robert Coover's Pricksongs and Descants rather
than his full-length The Public Burning; Pynchon's short novel, The Crying of
Lot 49, rather than his encyclopedic Gravity's Rainbow; Barth's conservative
The End of the Road and The Floating Opera rather than his massive self-reflexive Letters; and Gaddis's recent Carpenter's Gothic instead of his sprawling
The Recognitions or his largely auditory novel, J R. Reading some of the antirealistic novels is, of course, better than reading none of them; but the assumptions drawn from a few cautious selections produce a partial, and thus
slanted, perspective of these formidable works of fiction.
Alternate Worlds is an impressive study that works to enlarge that perspective. Rather than devote each chapter to a specific author, which would have
the effect of separating the discussions, Kuehl has organized eleven chapters
according to features that recur within a given range of authors and novels.
The advantage of this arrangement is twofold. First, Kuehl is able to examine
in adequate detail a long list of contemporary novels. A sense of coherence
and cohesiveness thus emerges across the postmodemist canon since this format emphasizes similarities among works that might otherwise appear divergent. Second, the arrangement allows for analysis of less read and less
known works. Included here are Colman Dowell's Island People, Susan Sontag's Death Kit, Alexander Theroux's Darconville's Cat, and Joseph McElroy's

Hind's Kidnap.

.

Kuehl's working definition of antirealism also helps the study to present a
balanced and expansive view of the subject. Defining antirealism as "the
whole body of nonimitative writing, including earlier domestic instances and
an adversarial stance towards what many besides F. R. Leavis consider the
great realistic tradition," Kuehl includes, but does not limit his analysis to devices such as self-reflexivity or linguistic play that are most commonly associated with the genre. He examines a span of antirealistic novels, and texts
that contain antirealistic qualities, while reaching as far back as Augustan satire and Cervantes' Don Quixote. Although Alternate Worlds concentrates on
American antirealism since World War II, using upostmodern" to stress its
contemporary qualities and distinguish it from Joycean and Proustian Modernism, the study consistently points to the continuity, richness, and international scope of antirealism. Working within that tradition, Kuehl can examine
Nathanael West's treatment of the grotesque in Miss Lonelyhearts alongside
Hawkes's grotesque characters in The Cannibal with sidelong glances at Colonial and American Transcendentalist varieties of the literary grotesque. linking the early examples in this instance to "an artistic mode already prominent
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in the Middle Ages: Kuehl contextualizes, and traditionalizes, what often
looks to readers to be wildly radical or impenetrable novels.
Kuehl's secondary purpose is to position antirealism on a paraliel track
with contemporary American realism as practiced by Updike, Styron, Bellow,
and Roth. These writers have worked their way with relative ease into a national consciousnesses as well as slipped into a dominant place in the American canon. In the meantime, antirealism has remained submerged in the canon's undercurrents, from where it surfaces intermittently, but more generally

keeps to its own metalinguistic, metafictional involutions.
As Kuehl indicates in his Preface, his strategy is essentially explication de
texte. A critical approach that has been overwhelmed by political, psychological, and numerous other approaches, explication de texte-despite questions
surrounding the validity of objective, universal standards-is precedential to
the other approaches, especially because antirealism is so difficult. Just as
Eliot's The Waste Land was driven through decades of New Criticism before it
would yield to psychobiographical and poststructuralist interpretations, these
antirealistic works-which incorporate elements designed to stymie readers
(Latin passages printed backwards), to scandalize them (scatological references) and to repel them (misogyny)-requlre the most essential of critical
tasks-to be read, then held up to a variety of critical approaches.
Each of the interior chapters of Alternate Worlds centers on a specific formal
or rhetorical mode: reflexivity, the ludic impulse, maximalism vs. minimalism, decentralization, the grotesque and diabolical, imaginary landscapes, absurd quests, fictitious history, conspiracy and paranoia, entropy, and nightmare/apocalypse. The chapter on ludic elements, for instance, examines Gilbert Sorrentino's Splendid-Hotel and Mulligan Stew, William Gass' Willie
Masters' Lonesome Wife, and Walter Abish's Alphabetical Africa. Kuehl examines the last text for its limiting, though curiously liberating form. Relying on
alphabetical order, Abish uses only NaN words in the first chapter, 'aN and "b'
words in the second, etc., until he reaches the end of the alphabet when he
reverses the pattern in subsequent chapters and returns to 'AN. Also citing
strategies structured on games like chess and baseball to experimental typography, the chapter offers a way into the novels of Abish, Gass, Sorrentino,
Federman, Coover, Barthelme and Theroux by connecting their strategies and
spirit of play.
The arrangement of sections is both traditional and unorthodox. The Introduction of Alternate Worlds, nearly sixty pages in length and written by James
Tuttleton, traces the development of American antirealism throughout the
nineteenth century. Entitled 'The American Roots of Contemporary Antirealism: this section often invokes Poe, Irving, and Melville for early examples
of postrnodernist qualities such as fictitious histories, reflexive designs, and
fantastic landscapes. Tuttleton's section, packed with literary/historical information, is an intriguing and useful addition to the book. It reiterates the point
that postrnodernist devices are not sudden inventions by postwar writers but
the creative refashioning of elements previously used, though perhaps less
extensively, by earlier writers. Thus, Barthelme's minimalism looks back to
the imagist minimalism of Crane's The Red Badge of Courage as the maximalist impulses in Pynchon's and Gaddis's works recall such massive novels as
Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, De Forest's Miss Ravenel's Conversion from Seces-
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sian to Loyalty and, of course, Melville's Moby-Dick. Kuehl's interior chapters
build from Tuttleton's Introduction, and gradually the differences between
nineteenth-century and tw-entieth-century antirealism emerge. These differences become most emphatic in the final section of Alternate Worlds, which is
an extended dialogue between Kuehl and Tuttleton.
For the most part, the question/answer format of the last section elucidates
two points of view. Drawing Alternate Worlds back into the history of the antirealistic narrative, the section pitches the expectations, purpose, and sociopolitical implications of realism and antirealism against each other. The antirealists' enjoyment of gameplaying, for instance, operates through their treating history as fiction and fiction as history while sometimes conjoining both
into nightmare or hallucination. The blurring of meaningful distinctions underscores the ambiguous relationship between writer and reader. What inferences do the postmodern antirealists wish their readers to draw? What divides their mock-heroic, anti-institutional, educational, humanistic stance
from nihilism? As Tuttleton queries Kuehl, if antirealists disassemble all
forms of order to proffer alternate visions that are as violent and oppressive
as the "objective" world which they reject, they will gradually lose their readership. Acknowledging the problem of audience and the disturbing preponderance of misogyny, fanaticism, even savagery, Kuehl generally defends
these "alternate worlds," which are nevertheless dazzling creations that engage readers in formidable intellectual challenges.
The writers whom Kuehl examines are most often male, and his distinguishing between twentieth-century "masculine" and "feminine" antirealism
is a point well taken, one offering provocative areas of investigation for other
critics, who often ignore the tradition of women's postmodemism. If writers
like West, Hawkes and Burroughs exhibit dislike or deprecating humor towards the functioning of the human body, others like AnaYs Nin, H. D., and
Kathy Acker revere or luxuriate in the body, particularly the female body,
and often move towards female friendship and community. With the differences between the male and female experimental tradition as complex as
those between the realist and antirealist traditions, Alternate Worlds, in progressing through a plethora of information, is a stimulating and comprehensive study which poses essential questions that reach across a century of
prose fiction in America. The structure, approach, and analyses of Alternate
Worlds both elucidate and challenge the writers who are its subject.
University of Hawaii

Miriam Fuchs

The Mode of Information. Poststructuralism and Social Context by Mark Poster.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990. Pp. 179. $29.95, cloth;
$10.95, paper.
The excitement and difficulties that Mark Poster's latest study generates
arise from his bold attempt to define "a theory able to decode the linguistic
dimension of the new forms of social interaction" occasioned by electronic
communication, Le. the "mode of information" (5), at the core of which he
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sees the representative capabilities of language, transformed by diverse
realms of communication (the media, data bases, state and corporate surveillance, scientific discourses). Organizing his study around the transformative
impact of and on language within these four regions, Poster follows what he
calls the Ndouble imperative" (18) of shuttling between, on one hand, particular poststructuralist positions that reveal "the self-referential linguistic
mechanisms" at work in the four aforementioned "sectors of electronically
mediated communication" and, on the other, these sectors themselves and
their subversion of the "authority effects of the poststructuralist position"
(18). By linking "sectors" to theoretical positions-TV ads to Baudrillard
(chapter 2), databases to Foucault (chapter 3), electronic writing to Derrida
(chapter 4), scientific discourse to Lyotard (chapter 5)-, Poster hopes to call
attention to the new features of "the contemporary social space," to modes of
analyzing it, and to the disruptive potential of the theoretical concepts that
his study foregrounds.
A powerful statement mid-way through the book both articulates Poster's
understanding of the unique phenomena that the "mode of information" initiates for all language forms, and points to the central inconsistency of his
study: by undermining Nthe time/space coordinates that have been employed
to fix language in various contexts," the IImode of information" lIopens up an
understanding of language and society that has no reference in the grid of
Renaissance perspective or the mimetic realism of Enlightenment reason."
While both speech and writing are available to logics of representation,N
"electronic language, on the contrary, does not lend itself to being so framed.
It is everywhere and nowhere, always and never. It is truly material/
immaterial" (85). This statement, and others like it, are at once stimulating
and disturbing since a project like Poster's, grounding itself in chapter 1 in a
strong critique of the misprision of the Ntotalizing forms of discourse" (notably, Frankfurt School neoMarxism, Daniel Bell, and Habermas) on which
postindustrial theories of society rely, would seemingly be adequately selfreflexive to avoid moves toward totalizing its own critical approach. However, just as I appreciate enormously the theoretical breakthrough that Poster
attempts, it is often difficult to see how the "mode of information" constitutes
any more than another totalizing analytical framework, plugged into the
most recent critical discourse, to be sure, but for that all the more unconvincing.
Indeed, it is not clear in some instances how the "mode of information"
provides a fundamentally useful vantage point for the critical perspectives
that it seeks to open. For example, after detailing in chapter 2 the limitations
of various approaches to the study of the Nmode of information"'s most
unique form, the TV ad, Poster points to Baudrillard's critique of the political
economy of the sign and to his later exploration of the destabilizing and simulating effects of communication (the Nhyperreal") as contributing to the
"mode of information"'s delineation. Yet, to counter what Poster maintains is
the "hyperreal"'s totalizing position that "forecloses the possibility of new
movements N(66), the "mode of information" would ostensibly provide a crucial understanding of the receiver's dual self-constituting role and decentered
position as Nsubject/object of the message" (67). While Poster's analysis certainly opens up the relationship of vie",.rer to the viewed, particularly to TV
N
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ads, in ways unexplored by previous critical approaches, what advantage this
insight might yield for further analysis is left undecided, even undecidable.
For the destabilized, active/passive viewer role points to simultaneous and
conflicting possibilities in "the media region of the mode of information/' on
one hand, of extending "the domain of unfreedom by the linguistic constitution of consumer subjects," on the other, of opening "discourse to a new level
of freedom by deconstructing all forms of centered subjects" (68).
Moreover, in contrast to the instability of the subject/object of electronically mediated communications is the oddly unitary form of subjectivity exploited by databases and surveillance regimes that emerges in chapter 3.
Calling upon Foucault's work on prisons in order better to emphasize the
emergent capabilities of the data-based "Superpanopticon" in which we are
currently immersed, "a means of controlling masses in the postmodem, postindustrial mode of information" (97), Poster's "uncomfortable discovery"
through discourse analysis "that the population participates in its own selfconstitution as subjects of the normalizing gaze of the Superpanopticon" (97)
is all the more uncomfortable since the destabilized, fraclured subject/object
of the televisual exchange is nonetheless controlled en masse, in totality, by
the effective manipulation of the "mode of information" itself. And again,
what is gained by Poster's skillful rapprochement between Foucault's analysis and the databased technology if the only "oppositional strategy" proposed
to counter the threat of "Superpanoptic" control is Lyotard's plea, '''give the
pUblic free access to the memory and data banks'" (98), that Poster finally
dismisses as not advancing "very far in the direction of postrnodem justice"
(154)?
However, in the shuttle diplomacy in chapter 4, between the sector of electronic writing and Derrida's conceptions of writing and context, Poster provides one of the most important readings to date of deconstruction,
"extracting it from the context of philosophical and literary texts and reinserting it in the social context of computer writing" so as better to contribute to
critical social theory's "reconstructive task of analyzing later twentieth-century society" (110). Unsurprisingly, given the theoretical position under scrutiny, undecidability rears its pixeled head in the form of the decentering effects of computer writing on individual subjectivity, dispersed across bulletin
boards and destabilized by new protocols of conferencing networks. Poster
concludes that Derrida's concept of "writing" and the anti-Iogocentric principle that it contains are placed entirely into question by the evanescent marks
or traces of computer writing that instantiates "the play deconstruction raises
only as a corrective, albeit a fundamental one, against the hubris of logocentrism" (128). Furthermore, Poster extends this insightful analysis in chapter 5 by exploring the question of how to theorize the political in the "mode
of information" in relation to scientific discourse. After situating the poststructuralist thinkers in the context of May '68 and its aftermath in order to
trace the political directions of the poststructuralist mediation on language,
Poster unfortunately provides entirely too little evidence of what he deems
suspicious in Deleuze and Guattari's "hermeneutic of desire," and thereby
diminishes important insights that A Thousand Plateaus might provide for the
study of cybernetics. Still, Poster emphasizes more fully the role that language plays in Lyotard' s works (particularly, The Postmodern Condition and
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The Differend) and in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's project, and interrogates the role that science can have when its project has been delegitimized
by the critique of "grand narratives" and "when electronic means of generating and disseminating science become available and are practiced" (144).
Having located Lyotard's ambivalence towards and cursory treatment of the
computerization of science, Poster then undertakes a fascinating, if somewhat
brief, reflection on the discursive role of cybernetics in science.
The importance of Poster's book is unmistakable for he skillfully negotiates
between and juxtaposes two wide theoretical domains-electronically mediated communications and poststructuralist theory-about which much has
been written, but hardly with the acumen that he brings to bear in a longawaited critical rapprochement. In my remarks, I have meant to engage his
work on its own terrain, but there. is no doubt that this opening sally into the
no longer speculative field of the "mode of information," whatever the contradictions that Poster raises without fully resolving, establishes a fertile
ground for further research on the relation of electronically mediated communication to social theory.
Wayne State University

Charles J. Stivale

Subversive Pleasures: Bakhtin, Cultural Criticism and Film by Robert Starn. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. Pp. xiii + 274. $28.50.
Robert Starn's often brilliant study persuasively demonstrates the usefulness bf Bakhtinian theory to contemporary film study and cultural criticism.
A number of film scholars have applied Bakhtin's ideas to particular issues in
film study: Vivian Sobchack writing on film noir or Dana Polan on spectacle
are only two critics who have shown the efficacy of Bakhtinian concepts in
the practice of film criticism. Starn's book, however, is the first sustained effort to provide theoretical grounding for such practice. At the same time, Subversive Pleasures implicitly critiques the dominant parochialism of contemporary film study with the bracing eclecticism of its method. Both for its basic
enterprise of installing Bakhtin as a touchstone for film scholars and for its
rangy, intellectually restless methodological alternative to the constricting
specialization of current film theory, Starn's book is among the most important recent contributions to film study.
These two tendencies of the book are, in fact, closely allied. The appeal of
Bakhtin, according to Starn, is that he prefigures crucial elements of poststructural thought, always fore grounding the centrality of language in human
interaction, while rejecting the insular qualities of the extreme, separate
branches of that thought: Bakhtin's formulations "have the advantage of not
restricting liberatory struggle to purely economic or political battles; instead
they extend it to the common patrimony of the utterance ... Discursive relationships, in this perspective, can be deciphered as micro historical encounters"(8). More specifically, the openness of Bakhtin's categories have the capacity to "deprovincialize a film-critical discourse too often tied to nineteenth-century European conventions of verisimilitude"(9). Thus, the claim of
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Bakhtinian theory to tum outward toward dialogue with other theories is reflected in Starn's encyclopedic deployment of the terms of semiotics, psychoanalysis, Marxism. Unlike, say, Kristin Thompson, who at the outset of
Breaking the Class Armor: NeoFormalist Film Analysis (1988) specifically rejects
the possibility of Formalism's engaging in "dialogue" with psychoanalysis
and "materialism" (p. 28), Starn repeatedly insists upon such dialogue among
styles of discourse, thereby producing a book that emblematizes the dialogic
imagination in the very structure of its argument. Starn's book moves with
agility among styles of thinking not to "synthesize" them but to re-think his
own position from multiple vantage points. Starn has seemingly read everything and knows how to bring adjacent critical traditions into alliance without forcing one to bow to the others. If this book's immense learning and the
way it is marshaled are accorded the attention they should be, the widespread disdain for eclecticism in film study should be finally banished. Only
rarely does Starn fall into some of critical pluralism's traps, as when he assigns the too-specific term of another writer to an ,insufficiently defined context. One of Starn's favorite rhetorical maneuvers, in fact, repeatedly indulges
in this tendency: "In the age of what Karen Jaehne calls the 'Great Detumescin the era of what Arthur Kroker calls 'panic sex'
ence .."(170); ".
... "(171); "... outside what Stephen Heath calls 'the sexual fix'"(177); "...
what Meeghan Morris [sic] calls 'the cheerleaders' and the 'prophets of
doom,'" (220) and so on, where in each case the needed term is smuggled in
a bit too handily. Elsewhere, Starn makes too-easy equivalencies between
complex terms, as when he conflates Bakhtin's dialogism with Kristeva's intertext (17). For the most part, though, the book is a model of how to validate
theory as a critical activity without pledging allegiance to a single theory. If
film scholarship is ever to lift itself from the categorical exclusionism in
which it is mired, Subversive Pleasures should serve as the vanguard.
The book's first two chapters deal with the trope of film language, arguing
for the applicability of Bakhtin's work to film by demonstrating the entrenchment of that trope in film theory from Eisenstein to Metz and beyond. As always, however, Starn is concerned with widening the boundaries of particular discourses, de-centering the usual semiotic thrust of such discussions by
introducing concepts of "translinguistics" as well as of difference and power:
For Bakhtin, "even consciousness is linguistic, and therefore social, and thus
an objective fact and a social force. . The Bakhtinian conception of language, then, constitutes a vehicle for avoiding the trap of mechanistic
economism"(32). One problem with this section of the book is precisely its
emphasis on Bakhtin's philosophy of language: I am not unconvinced that
translinguistics "allows" the application of Bakhtin's theory to non-novelistic
genres, but I wonder why Starn has chosen not to discuss at greater length
Bakhtin's theory of genre itself. In "Discourse in the Novel," Bakhtin opens
up the genre to such an extent that it becomes all-embracing, readily admitting film. (Michael Holquist speaks of "the novel's intensifying anti-generic
power" in Bakhtin's work.) At the same time, such an emphasis might have
led Starn to come fully to terms with Bakhtin's incipient Formalism, for the
traces of which Starn harbors obvious distaste. Still, Bakhtin frequently finds
himself on what Starn would call the wrong side of the Formalist distinction
between literary and non-literary discourse: "Literary language is a highly
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distinctive phenomenon," he claims in The Dialogic Imagination (p. 294,
where he develops the argument fully). Given this distinction redolent of the
Formalist heritage, the question becomes how it problematizes Bakhtin's
privileging of the "folk" with their carnivalesque rejections of the officially literary.

Starn is certainly aware of all the potential problems in Bakhtin's work,
and he deals with this one to his own satisfaction in his introduction (p. 20).
The third, fourth, and fifth chapters of the book, less concerned with Bakhtin's theories as such, apply them to such phenomena as the carnival in artcinema, the marginal status of Latin American film, and porn films. These are
the most successful sections of the book, and the vital, deeply affectionate
chapter on Brazilian cinema should certainly bring this important "Third
Cinema" into the purview of American film study. Starn's Bakhtin is an invigoratingly Utopian figure, unleashing repressed energies, redeeming the
marginalized, and triumphantly bridging the "immense gap between left cultural criticism and the people it purports to serve"(238). (Who, I wonder?) If
this reading of Bakhtin's multi-vocality leads Starn to some embarrassing excesses-his tinny-sounding and decidedly non-hip effort to appear with-it by
congratulating Melvin Van Peebles on his ability to "get down and talk
black"(82)-it must also account for the extraordinary power of his commentary on, for example, the Brazilian chanchada. Here Starn explores cultural
attitudes that might easily be exoticized, constructed as Other, but with Bakhtin's help Starn constructs them as genuinely egalitarian, liberational, Utopian. This section of the book is the most persuasive that Bakhtin's theory
can do what Starn claims it can do: negotiate difference and transform it into
a form of identification.
Moreover, an understanding of Bakhtin's multi-vocality enables Starn to
discuss pornography with none of the shrillness, the evangelism, or the trueconfessions ardor frequently attendant upon such analysis. Although not
comparable in scope to Linda Williams's recent work on pornography, Starn's
chapter not only designates some of the crucial features of porn-as-genre, but
also tests those theories by pointing to the simulacra of them offered by porn:
"It is useful to regard porn, I think, as an 'ersatz' or 'degraded' carnival, one
that capitalizes on the repressed desire for carnival-style eroticism by serving
up the simulacrum of its utopian promise"(169).
This problem of the uses of carnival in political contexts is one I am not
sure Starn (or Bakhtin) has sufficiently traced. What about texts that mimic
features of carnival while legislating against the aims of openness or of liberationism? Starn mentions in passing the Bakhtinian resonances of T. S. Eliot's
thought; and in fact, Eliot's work foregrounds parody and popular forms
such as the music-hall tradition; it sets multiple textual registers into allusive
juxtaposition; its reflexivity is densely ironic; it deals repeatedly with
masques and pageants-yet nobody would call Eliot's a "dialogic imagination." Although Starn warns repeatedly against "essentializing" Bakhtin, I
can't help feeling there must be some essential attribute-the text's positioning of its own accessibility, perhaps-of the dialogic text, the absence of
which makes Eliot's work "authoritative discourse" (Bakhtin's term) in spite
of its dialogic surface.
This problem is most troubling in the chapter in which Starn turns his sus-
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tained attention to a single text, Woody Allen's Zelig. Since Stam emphasizes
throughout the book the politically oppositional potential of Bakhtin's ideas,
the choice of this text for prolonged analysis seems to me quite odd indeed.
Hardly an example of "popular culture," Allen's hectic catalogue of styles is a
wan burlesque haunted by High Modernism on the one hand (personified by
S. Sontag, I. Howe, S. Bellow) and the art-cinema tradition on the other. Far
from being the spontaneous interaction in the spirit of free contact Bakhtin
celebrates, the incorporation of these diverse styles is self-consciously tortured and anxiety-ridden, the mirror of Zelig's own "problem." Further, the
text is dogged by intense body-hatred: as homophobic as all Allen's films,
this one decrees the validity of exactly one sexual practice and regards all
others with disgust. Finally, the conception of the populace that emerges
from the film is akin to the High Modernist dread of mass culture: Zelig's
chameleonic tendencies do not celebrate but mock the possibility of negotiating difference and, though to an extent lesser than in Stardust Memories, the
"carnivals" in which the masses threateningly congregate are marked by their
unbending alterity: the Philistines, Allen wants us to know, are at the gates.
My disagreement with Starn here may be a matter of interpretation, but I
think it grows from Starn's treatment of tradition as a concept. Although
Starn suggests that Bakhtin was not hostile to modernism, as was Georg
Lukacs, it is still true that the traditions Bakhtin favored are notably premodern. In fact, the one "modernist" Bakhtin devotes some attention to is the
same one Lukacs was able to tolerate, Thomas Mann. Moreover, Bakhtin's
rejection of Fonnalism may have been tantamount to a critique of modernism
because of the deep alliance between Formalism and the cultural avant-garde
of the early twentieth-century. If Formalism is designed specifically to deal
with the shifting assumptions of literary modernism, are those concepts of
Bakhtin's most inimical to Formalism equipped to deal with these assumptions in any way? Starn begins to treat these issues: carnival is "the Bakhtinian category most susceptible to co-optation"(94); "In the modernist period, carnival ceases to be a collective cleanSing ritual open to all people and
becomes the instrument of a marginalized caste"(98). But to show repeatedly
how Bui\uel, Wertmuller, Monty Python, Woody Allen and others are part of
a "larger" Menippean tradition is at least in part to deny what is decisively
modernist in their orientation. All this is only to say that I wish Starn's book,
for all its brilliance, and especially given Bakhtin's reticence on the matter,
had more fully contextualized Bakhtin's answerability to the polyvalent but
autotelic strategies of historical modernism-or their answerability to him.

North Carolina State University

James Morrison
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Deleuze and Guattari, by Ronald Bogue. New York and London: Routledge,
1989. Pp. 196. $42.50. $16.95 (paper).

Many graduate students and established scholars in the human sciences
have difficulty with the terminolOgical swirls and the subversion of conventional academic decorum in the two volumes by the philosopher Gilles Deleuze and the psychoanalyst Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand
Plateaus, both subtitled Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Ronald Bogue's Deleuze
and Guattari attempts to map those swirls and disruptions. Bogue's aim is in
part to clarify the extent to which their tactics illustrate rather than obscure
their strategy, which may be defined as a radical transvaluation of conventional models of human consciousness, language and culture, as they are applied in philosophy, literary studies, psychoanalysis and politics.
Deleuze and Guattari is an ambitious project, especially when one considers
the danger of reduction common to introductory texts, a reduction apparent
in other recent introductions that explain continental philosophy while following the perhaps necessary Anglo-American analytic bias toward simplicity and clarity that is not shared by the works being described.
Happily, Ronald Bogue succeeds in this exposition of the works of Deleuze
and Guattari because he makes good on three claims. First, Bogue insists on
the continuity and coherence of Deleuze's early studies of "marginal" Western philosophers and on "minor" literary figures. Bogue then demonstrates
that continuity by tracing the genealogy of key terms and concepts from Deleuze's early works to Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, as if his philosophy were systematic. In fact, half the book is devoted to Deleuze's early
work, and anything that might get lost in Bogue's reconstruction is more than
balanced by his accessible exposition of the evolution of concepts addressed
in these works, concepts that are often arcane (e.g. Plato's simulacrum; the
Stoics' incorporeals and bodies; Nietzsche's Eternal Return), and subtle (e.g.
nomad; rhizome; body without organs; desiring machines). At the same time,
Bogue is carefui to emphasize that Deleuze's series of studies, including the
collaborative works, must be construed as "works of art .... a creative and
ongoing production of interconnections, not the revelation of a prevenient
whole." If the development of concepts in these works is not systematic, it is
perhaps organic, even self-organizing in a rigorous sense not yet understood.
Second, Bogue refuses to underestimate Guattari's contribution to Anti-

Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. Specifically, Bogue finds prominent in
these volumes Guattari's clinically as well as theoretically informed theory of
group subjectivity, a subjectivity that has "its own laws ... forms of resistance, transference, fantasy." In other words, Guattari's theory of group subjectivity is a macroscopic formuiation, a political unconscious (to which Fredrich Jameson owes much) that may be analyzed through an exploded model
of "desiring-production" that draws on (yet completely reformulates in a
Nietzschean context) Marxist and Freudian models and terminology. In AntiOedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, Guattari's theory of group subjectivity is
merged with Deleuze's science of beCOming, a theory of "what is possible"
applied in earlier works not only to Proust's obsession with signs, memory
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and the contingency of time, but to Sacher-Masoch's explorations of the limits of desire and the law. This science of becoming has its roots in the physis
of Nietzsche's affirmative nihilism, a theory of difference rooted in physics,
not semiology, a theory of forces articulated through the seminal concepts
"will to power" and the "Eternal Return." These concepts are developed first
in Deleuze's study Nietzsche and Philosophy, and then explored further in a
series of imaginative studies of thought, signs, subjectivity and cultural patternings in philosophers and literary figures: Spinoza, Bergson, Proust,
Sacher-Masoch, the Stoics, Kant, Kafka, Marx and Freud.
According to Deleuze, Nietzsche's "'will to power" determines the relationship between "the active and reactive qualities of force" that involves both
discourse and the body, and yet which is independent of force itself. It is "the
power of becoming that plays through forces, differentiating them and linking them both spatially and temporally." The active is pure becoming; the reactive functions to constrain, to establish limits on what is active. In human
consciousness, the reactive emerges as ressentiment; in culture, the reactive
assumes all forms of repression, control, management, ideology. Far from
being a cyclical theory of history (as with Spengler), The Eternal Return designates a return to becoming and difference, not being and sameness. The
Eternal Return affirms the always-already contingency of past and future, as
it is reformulated in every present moment: a "world of flux and multiplicity," the Eternal Return" defines becoming as "chance or chaos," which in tum
is motivated by the "will to power."
In addition, Bogue discusses at length Deleuze and Guattari's study Kafka:
For a Minor Literature, in which they apply their Nietzschean theory of the
nomad as an aleatory subject in a social field defined as a chaos of desire and
contingency, objectified by simulacra, and constrained by cultural and psychological machinery. They examine the symptoms of subject and field in
Kafka's fictional obsessions with law and desire, with "Oedipal traps and
lines of flight." They do so to postulate a positive theory of a "minor literature" that deterritorializes language and deforms cultural and psychological
representations.
Third, by situating Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus against Deleuze's
evolving philosophical corpus, and against Guattari's clinical and political
program, Bogue demonstrates clearly the significance of these two works
(particularly the earlier and notorious Anti-Oedipus) beyond their historical
identification with the Parisian barricades of 1968, an event discussed in the
"Introduction," Rather than being concerned with revolution in a Marxist
sense, Deleuze and Guattari propose" a politics of creativity" that focuses on
the potential of the always-already open cultural system, instead of on an origin enabled by insurrection, or on a completion enabled by a new order of
things. In other words, this study will help explain (despite Bogue's claim for
Guattari's contribution) why Foucault suggests that, in the field of the human
sciences, the Twentieth Century may someday be known as Deleuzian.
Deleuze and Guattari's collaborative volumes engage in a Nietzschean synthesis of the Marxist theory of production, and Freud's theory of the libido, in
the conflated term "desiring- production." They state that the Oedipal scenario structures desire in capitalist countries, and that psychoanalysis helps
to enforce the restrictions imposed by that structure. Also, they agree with
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the Marxist formulation that capitalism reduces all human interactions to
"commodity relations of universal equivalency." Capitalism therefore "deterritorializes" desire by exploding the limits not only created by the Oedipal
scenario, but the limits created by other traditional structures as well. Yet,
capitalism also "reterritorializes" desire by forcing it to manifest itself through
the network of commodity-relations. While the Oedipal scenario helps to focus human desire through the family, leaving its residue to wander the leveled field of universal equivalency, capitalism also generates "schizophrenic
fluxes" of material and human refuse, which is then forced through the Oedipal conduit. Deleuze and Guattari then define clinical schizophrenia as the
human refuse (institutionalized or not) in which "Oedipalization has not 'taken'." Their project is to build a psychoanalysis, aesthetics and politics that valorizes the schizo-flux. They provide a schizo-analysis of the multiple cultural
machines of desiring- production, and a program for resistance to those machines based on nomadic and rhizomatic thought and action, a theory of
subjective contingency and aggregation that explains simultaneously the
"rhizomatic" writings of Kafka, jazz performance and even the "events" of
John Cage, the multiple human formations of the dance troop Pilobolus, as
well as the "cells" of the PLO and the "affinity groups" of the Weatherman
faction of the SDS.

II
Ronald Bogue's Deleuze and Guattari succeeds brilliantly and I have but
two reservations with his emphasis. First, Deleuze and Guattari weakly represents Deleuze's interest in Bergson's elaboration of Nietzsche's "science of
becoming" in human psychology, physics and biology. Through such works
as Matter and Memory, Duration and Simultaneity and Creative Evolution, Bergson's discussion of contingent duration, memory and elan vital had seminal
influence on Deleuze's study of Proust's Remembrance of Things Past (as well
as on Proust himself), Deleuze's studies on cinema, as well as his formulations of processes mainly identified with Nietzsche's concept of the nomad.
This interest may be examined in Deleuze's own study, entitled Bergsonism,
which gets scant attention in Deleuze and Guattari. This work not only remains as influential in Bergson scholarship as Nietzsche and Philosophy has
been with Nietzsche scholars, but would also help illuminate what Bogue
explains with otherwise great success. Deleuze draws on Bergson's theory of
memory, duration and elan vital to conceive of the ways in which multiple
experiences of contingent duration-and of the contingent nature of invented
models of past and future with reference to pure duration-play in the fields
of simulacra that constitute culture. These fields are governed by the "will to
power" and the Eternal Return; and Deleuze and Guattari's method helps to
dissolve distinctions among the disciplines, and distinctions among the categories that distinguish those disciplines: signs, thoughts, concepts, institutions as subjectivities, and so forth. While Gillian Rose, in her work The Dialectics of Nihilism, argues dismissively that Deleuze's philosophy is metaphysical and should be called "the new Bergsonism," she has intuited an
important genealogy that begins with Boltzmann's Order Principle from ther-
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modynamics and emerges in attempts to construct correspondences between
physics and cultural processes, the most successful formulation of which has
been information theory.
My second reservation thus concerns how Bogue draws out then drops
hints of a crucial drama that begins with Deleuze's fascination with Nietzsche's
obsession on a physis of difference and of becoming. A theory of correspondences between nature on the one hand and consciousness and culture formation on the other that Nietzsche (and Bogue) describe largely in the terminology of dynamics (a physics of forces), this physis seems instead to draw on
what lIya Prigogine has argued as the ideologically opposed discourses of
dynamics and thermodynamics, one emphasizing precision, geometry and
the reversibility of time, the other emphasizing statistical formulations, biological processes and the irreversibility of time. (Deleuze and Prigogine quote
each other's works on a number of occasions, by the way.) Since a reversible
model of time requires a static, regulated duration represented (for example,
in calculus) as an infinite series of still frames of discrete moments framed by
a geometry of space-time interstices, it is hard to account for the ways in
which Nietzsche's fascination with the "will to power" and the "Eternal
Return" fits into such a dynamiCS, unless one identifies the reactive machinery of ressentiment with dynamics, a machinery that attempts to control the
contingencies of duration. In other words, Nietzsche's eternal return, as a science of becoming, is Bergson's concept of contingent duration, which is Prigogine's arrow of time underlying all systems, dynamic and thermodynamic.
The question is, what do we make of Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze and Guattari and Prigogine's attempt to construct correspondences between the laws
of physics and the laws of consciousness and culture?
Needless to say, these two reservations merely indicate my reaction to
Bogue's book, the limits to a powerfully useful introduction to Deleuze and
Guattari. Perhaps they suggest directions for further research. Except for
these reservations, Ronald Bogue's Deleuze and Guattari is a good read indeed.

Arizona State University

Martin E. Rosenberg

Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of Negativity in Literature and Literary
Theory, ed. Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. Pp. xxi + 394. 1 photo. $53.95.
In a critical age defined by the fashionable shibboleths of negativity, uncertainty, self-consciousness, contradiction, differance, and insufficiency it is entirely appropriate that a volume articulating the "play of negativity" appear.
Published as the third in Columbia University's Irvine Studies in the Humanities with Robert Folkenflik as general editor, this important work collects fifteen essays along with a lucid introduction under the general assumption
that "[w]hat allows the unsayable to speak is the undoing of the spoken
through negativity. Since the spoken is doubled by what remains silent,
undoing the spoken gives voice to the inherent silence which itself helps sta-
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bilize what the spoken is meant to mean" (xvii). The result of extensive consultations between its contributors that culminated in a conference led by the
co-editors in June of 1986 at the Institute for Advanced Studies of Hebrew
University in Jerusalem, the final achievement is impressive: a provocative
and heterogeneous display of the breadth of scholarship on negativity along
with a convincing demonstration of the extent to which unsayability and
negativity are embedded historically and ideologically in Occidental literary
discourse.
The collection is divided into three parts: (1) "Unsaying," in which the
philosophical groundwork is laid through studies of negative theology, Heidegger, Adorno, and Beckett; (2) "Proliferating," in which the more specific
literary applications of negativity are pursued in essays on modern poetry,
Celan, Blake, Faulkner, medieval allegory, George Eliot, and the "tradition"
that links Homer and Virgil to Dryden and Pope; (3) "Perfonning," in which
negation and textual play are studied, first by Wolfgang Iser's more theoretical essay on "The Play of the Text" and then by Stanley Cavell, who puts
negative play into practice by examining the "melodrama of the unknown
woman" (340) in "Naughty Orators: Negation of Voice in Gaslight."
The introductory remarks on "Modes of Negativity" suggest that

negativity, or some equivalent means of eschewing indicative terminology, becomes inevitable when we consider the implications, omissions,
or cancellations that are necessarily part of any writing or speaking.
These lacunae indicate that practically all formulations (written or spoken) contain a tacit dimension, so that each manifest text has a kind of
latent double ... this inherent doubling in language defies verbalization. It forms the written and unwritable-unsaid and unsayable-base
of the utterance. But it does not therefore negate the formulations of
the text or saying. Rather it conditions them through blanks and negations. (xii)
Though the co-editors' introductory remarks posit distinctions between the
concepts of negation, negativity, and nothingness (xii-xiii), the distinctions
remain, perhaps deliberately so, hazy. For example, on the one hand we are
told that "[i]n its undetermined proliferation, negatiVity speaks for something
that is arguably as real as anything else we know, even if it can be located
only by carving out a void within what is being said" (xi) while, on the other
we are told somewhat paradoxically that the "operations [of negativity] .
can never be equated with nothing, nothingness, or denial, or with the aims
of avoiding or nullifying" (xiii).
We are also told that "negation ... must be distinguished from negativity"
(xii) without a sufficient elaboration of that important distinction, or a sufficient definition of "negation." In Budick's essay "Tradition in the Space of
Negativity," as part of a discussion of apostrophe and negativity in Homer
and Virgil and their translations by Dryden and Pope, there is a reiteration of
a rather loose distinction between negation and negativity (taken from Iser's

The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response):
Blanks and negations increase the density of fictional texts, for the
omissions and cancellations indicate that practically all the fonnula-
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tions of the text refer to an unformulated background, and so the formulated text has a kind of unformulated double. This 'double' we ...
call negativity. (317)
Similar as it is to a previously cited passage, one wonders about the unwritten nature of these "[b]lanks and negations" as they are intended in the context of the volume. On the one hand, negativity seems a "means of eschewing indicative terminology," a function that seems more properly attributable
to "negation," whereas, on the other hand, negativity is not a means but
rather an "unformulated background" doubling the "formulated text." The
problems that inhere in Budick's and Iser's theoretical discourse about the
unsaid are significant for how they initiate further questions about the resonant silences and omissions that give depth to discourse, the "forms of things
unknown" which the "poet's pen / Turns ... to shapes.. [giving] aery
nothing / A local habitation and a name" (A Midsummer Night's Dream, V.i.
15-17). Certainly, the questions asked by Pierre Macherey seem pertinent
here (as does his rather puzzling omission from the substance of these essays): "in order to say anything, there are certain things which must not be said
... Silences shape all speech ... Can we say that this silence [sic] is hidden?
What is it? A condition of existence-point of departure, methodical beginning-essential foundation-ideal culmination-absolute origin which lends
meaning to the endeavour? Means or form of connection" (A Theory of Literary Production [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, 85])? The theoretical
framework behind the use of the term "negation" would seem to require a
similar reevaluation to determine what constitutes a "negation" and what relationship "negation" has to the "unformulated double" that is the negativity
immanent in a text.
Along the same lines is the suggestion made by the editors that "negativity
not only shows that it is not negative, since it constantly lures absence into
presence. While continually subverting that presence, negativity, in fact,
changes it into a carrier of absence of which we would not otherwise know
anything" (xiv). The paradox of a negativity that is "not negative" suggests
that negativity entails an interplay between the "negative" and the "not negative." Such an interplay raises ontological, epistemological, not to mention
linguistic questions about experience as it is expressed in language: Is language not so much what it says but what it fails to say, avoids saying, or
frames as unsayable? How can we know and define the silent otherness that
inheres in language? How can language and therefore literature express their
unsayability while continuing to sustain meaning? The implicit thesis that
language is most evocative, most meaningful, most plentiful and multivalent,
at the point at which it unsays and gives vent to the inexpressible through
the "play of negativity" is a challenge which readers of this volume cannot
avoid. The criticisms raised here point to the need for a critical debate on issues relating to negativity and do not detract from this book as a significant
attempt to formulate and apply a theoretical framework to understanding the
play of negativity and unsayability in discourse.
The lengthy lead essay, "How to Avoid Speaking" (originally published as
"Comment ne pas parler: Denegations" in Psyche: Inventions de /'autre [Paris:
Galilee, 1987]) by Jacques Derrida shows the myriad connections between
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mystic and theoretical practices that affirm the paradoxical presence of the
negative. The essay provisionally supposes "that negative theology consists
of considering that every predicative language is inadequate to the essence,
in truth to the hyperessentiality (the being beyond Being) of God; consequently, only a negative 'apophatic' attribution can claim to approach God,
and to prepare us for a silent intuition of God" (4). Invoking Plato, Pseudo
Dionysius, Meister Eckhart, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Jean-Luc Marion,
Derrida's essay reinscribes Wittgenstein's seminal notions (from the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus): "6.522-The inexpressible, indeed exists. It shows itself;
it is the mystical" and '7.-Concerning that about which one cannot speak,
one must remain silent" (11).
For Derrida, the obligation ("one must") to remain silent is reinscribed "into
the order or the promise of a 'one must speak,' 'one must-not avoid speaking'; or rather 'it is necessary (il [aut) that there be a trace.' No, 'it is necessary that there have been a trace,' a sentence that one must simultaneously
turn toward a past and toward a future that are as yet unpresentable" (1112). The "play of negativity" occurs at this imprecise juncture between speaking and unspeaking, sound and silence, past and future. Literature and its
criticism entail a "tracing" of the conjunction between what is affirmed and
what is negated, what is spoken (expressible) and what is left unspoken
(inexpressible), if one is to remember the past (by its unspoken traces embedded in what is spoken) and create a future (by the necessity to speak and
thereby anticipate the trace of the unspoken).
The density of the argument, as is typical with Derrida, confronts the reader's capacity to formulate speech as well as to remain silent, recognizing all
the while that "consciousness ... [is] that place in which is retained the singular power not to say what one knows, to keep a secret in the form of
representation" (17). Derrida ends in the interrogative mode in which he begins, by asking "If there were a purely pure experience of prayer, would one
need religion and affirmative or negative theologies? Would one need a supplement of prayer? But if there were no supplement, if quotation did not
bend prayer, if prayer did not bend, if it did not submit to writing, would a
theiology be possible? Would a theology be possible" (62)? Negation and silence define the point at which speech ends and the hypostatic idea of a
"purely pure experience of prayer" begins. Thus their "presence" leads, perhaps, to the possibility of prayer, theology, and God. Certainly, the admixhue of Derrida's thought with Christian and Neoplatonic negative theology
makes for a particularly evocative beginning to the collection; the essay
deftly surveys the difficult terrain of apophatic thought while proleptically
formulating the "place" of speech that is not speech in the (im)possibility of
theology.
The essays following Derrida's are no less challenging. Mercifully they
avoid the all-too-frequent blight that falls upon such collections in which authors refuse to acknowledge the intertextual context of their essays. Thus,
Frank Kermode's essay on "Endings, Continued" in which he attempts an
"updating" of The Sense of an Ending also reflects on Derrida's beginnings by
reinscribing Derrida: "one must think of the khora [Platonic 'place'] as Dionysius thought of the good: as the formless which confers form. It is in this respect that it seems to resemble the place to which negative theology hopes to
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be directed by prayer as it passes through the wilderness of discourse" (77).
In the same inter-reflective mode Kermode comments on Derrida's use of
aposiopoesis, the rhetorical figure in which "the speaker comes to a sudden
halt, as if unwilling or unable to proceed, though something not expressed
must be understood" (OED): "you can use it ... to draw attention to the actual predicament of the speaker, hindered by the very processes of his own
thought from moving on, from saying what comes next ... [it] substitutes silence for speech" (89-90). That silence is the nothingness (or doubling) of
speech raises the spectre "of the relation of ontological Nothingness to Being"
(95) and the "possibility or impossibility of saying anything about that Being"
(95). Gabriel Motzkin's essay, "Heidegger's Transcendent Nothing," reflects
on these ideas while Gerald L. Bruns's essay, "Disappeared: Heidegger and
the Emancipation of Language," considers Heidegger's by now commonplace
notion (stated in "Das Wesen der Sprache") that '''the essential nature of language flatly refuses to put itself in words-in the language, that is, in which
we make statements about language' ... So when language speaks it does
not do so (if we can imagine this) by means of language" (137).
Jonathan Culler's essay "On the Negativity of Modem Poetry: Friedrich,
Baudelaire, and the Critical Tradition," begins with Hugo Friedrich's assumption that modern poetry is rife with negative categories including "[d]eformation, depersonalization, obscurity, dehumanization, incongruency, dissonance
and empty ideality" (189). Culler takes the use of such categories, and especially depersonalization, to be "reductive" in that they "empty the lyric of
everything except the movement of consciousness" thus "contribut[ingJ to an
ideology of lyric and of self that systematically recuperates negativity" (197).
The problem for Culler, then, is that such categories "produce a general
model which obscures the aspects of the poems that resist the typical modes
of recuperation" (197). Culler, assiduously takes to task Bruns's notion (expressed in Modern Poetry and the Idea of Language) that "the work becomes silence, everything in it neutralized" (206) because of its "powerful appeal to
the consolations of the negative" (206). Negative categories can lead to "radical eliminations" (206), repressions, and totalizations that require further consideration for how they affect the critical process. This suggestion, coming as
it does more or less at the centre of the book, alerts readers to the reductive
dangers inherent in any discourse that claims the capacity to recuperate and
inscribe the negative. Clearly Budick and Iser have not avoided dissension
and difference within the collection and for this they are to be praised.
Perhaps this volume's principal contribution to scholarship is its implicit
suggestion that the unsayable and negativity are central to an emergent reevaluation of the Western intellectual tradition, a reevaluation that posits silence, nothingness, voicelessness, negation, and inexpressibility as implicated
in the pursuit (and deconstruction) of the rational. The most convincing evidence of this pursuit's vast historical and ideological persistence lies in the
number of critics, poets and philosophers who are not (or only cursorily)
mentioned in the volume, yet whose contributions to our awareness of the
negative and the unsayable have been substantial: Pascal, Donne, Rochester,
Shakespeare, Sanches, Freud, Sartre, Valery, Kenneth Burke, Rosalie Colie,
Macherey, Barthes, Nishida Kitaro, to mention only a few. Though the volume's focus is on Western thought it neglects significant crossovers to East-
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em thought, especially as related to Japanese Zen philosophy and Eastern
onto theologies in which the formless and the unsayable figure significantly (a
lack filled in part by Robert E. Carter, ed., God, the Self and Nothingness: Refiections Eastern and Western [New York: Paragon House, 1990]).
In a volume as diverse and rich as this it is perhaps unfair to point to what
it fails to do. However, the absences must he noted as being almost equally
resonant in the "play of negativity" that is this book. Certainly, as has just
been suggested, an essay connecting elements of relevant Eastern philosophical thought to Western literary and critical practice would have been useful
in enlarging the book's already substantial scope. The book also avoids direct
confrontation with problems relating to the political nature and implications
of unsaying and negativity: to what extent does the predilection for modes of
negativity and unsaying function as a means to obscure or enhance the political elements that figure in discourse? That tropes of inexpressibility and negativity have political uses in both literary and critical contexts is a fact that
the book does not address sufficiently, especially given its genesis in Jerusalem (and especially given the substantial space it devotes-two essays-to
Heidegger).
Perhaps the most tantalizing section of the book in what it promises to say
but leaves unsaid is the third on "Play" with its two highly suggestive essays
by Iser and Cavell. The sense of negativity and unsayability as elements in
the performative function of language and expression, part, if you will, of
their musical nature (yet another aspect of textual unsaying that is not addressed head-on), seems an important aspect of the discourse of negativity
for, as Iser suggests, "[b]y allowing us to have absence as presence, play turns
out to be a means whereby we may extend ourselves" (338). Negativity and
unsaying create opportunities for self-extension and for the illusion of a presence that is inviolable (because it is unsaid). This notion is echoed by Cavell's suggestion that "[b]oth excess and emptiness express the human wish to
escape the human-the desire for the inhuman, or the demonic" (364) and
leads to the larger questions of excess, emptiness, and the play of negativity
as related to why we read (and write) literature and criticism. Implicit in the
relationship between criticism and literature is the idea that critical unsaying
"gives voice to [an] inherent silence" that can not otherwise be filled. That the
"negative capability" of criticism may be said to "stabilize what the spoken is
meant to mean" is one of the abiding myths which this book furthers, perhaps at the expense of understanding negativity as a disruptive force pointing
to the unspoken void beyond and implicit within the text's origins in the unspoken silence of the blank page. That the book ends with these provocations to further thought, evoking the unsayable resonances that inhere in
Cavell's use of the image of "gaslight," is part of a clever design that suggests
how much is left unsaid, and how resonant that unsaying remains.
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